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Abstract—Despite extensive study on wireless sensor network 
security, defending internal attacks and finding abnormal behaviour 
of the sensor are still difficult and unsolved task. The conventional 
cryptographic technique does not give the robust security or detection 
process to save the network from internal attacker that cause by 
abnormal behavior.  The insider attacker or abnormally behaved 
sensor identificationand location detection framework using false 
massage detection and Time difference of Arrival (TDoA) is 
presented in this paper. It has been shown that the new framework 
can efficiently identify and detect the insider attacker location so that 
the attacker can be reprogrammed or subside from the network to 
save from internal attack. 
 
Keywords—Insider Attaker identification, Abnormal Behaviour, 
Location detection, Time difference of Arrival (TDoA), Wireless 
sensor network 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IRELESS sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially 
distributed autonomous sensors and provide a 
theoretical basis for many different applications range military 
implementation in the battlefield, environmental monitoring, 
health sector as well as emergency response of surveillance. It 
is an application dependant technology which can be changed 
and additional sensor nodes can be deployed based on the 
necessity. The sensor nodes consists a transceiver unit 
(combination of transmitter and receiver), a restricted memory 
processing unit, a sensing unit as well as a battery with limited 
power. Thus, for any application overhead of computation and 
communication is low. In order to ensure the efficient 
functionality of WSN, security mechanism is essential, 
especially in the field of emergency response or battlefield 
implementations. But security in the wireless sensor network 
is challenging and important task because of the construction 
of the node. Many algorithms have developed in order to 
secure WSN. Most of the work has focused on the pair wise 
key establishment, authentication access control and defense 
against attack.  
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Most importantly these works mainly focused on the 
traditional cryptographic information, data authentication in 
order to build the relationship between the sensors but the 
unreliable communication through wireless channel made the 
techniques vulnerable by allowing the sensor nodes to 
compromise and release the security information to the 
adversary [1]. Through this access, the adversaries can easily 
attack the network internally with data alteration, message 
negligence, selective forwarding as well as by jamming the 
network. Adversaries can be determined through the abnormal 
behaviour of the sensor. 
Unfortunately, the internal attack (the sensor 
behavesabnormally) remains unsolved through the 
conventional way of WSN security which implements the 
encrypting method or authentication. Thus, it is important to 
detect and its location information to provide the complete 
security to the WSN. [2] In this research work we proposed a 
twostep method to overcome the security issue. In the first 
step, the insider attacker or abnormal behavior of the senor 
will be detected by using the false massage detection process 
while in the second step the attacker will be located using 
Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) triangulation through 
three beacon nodes location information. With the detection of 
the abnormal behavior of the sensor (insider attack) and 
location information a further approach is taken to make the 
network secure by reprogramming the node or obsolete the 
node form the network.  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 is comprised of 
the overview of the related work followed by a description of 
the proposed framework in section 3. This section covers the 
details of insider attacker identification process and location 
detection. The efficiency of the framework is presented in 
Result section followed by conclusion section 5. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Numerous ways and solution have been proposed to secure 
the WSN. So far, security using attacker (abnormal behaviour 
of the sensor) identification and location discovery has not 
given significant attention. Even though number of 
localization process has been proposed in different research 
but main focus was given on preventing and securing routing 
from attacks. As the study was done by [3], however, most of 
the scheme proposed are needed to have special device, such 
as SeRLoc [4]  the improved version of SeRLoc is HiRLoc [5] 
requires directional antenna, SPINE requires nano second 
timing scale. Attack resilient location estimation method [6] 
proposed by Lui fails if the attacker is compromised. ROPE is 
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combination of SeRLoc and SPINE [7], it require extra 
hardware and pair wise key with every locator 
These developments somehow solve the mathematical 
problems with certain constrain but does not take the insider 
attacker identification and location detection in consideration. 
In our paper we have come up with the approach to identify 
and detect the internal attacker. 
III. NETWORK MODEL OR FRAMEWORK DESCRIPTION 
A. Assumptions 
In our experimental works we use the following parameters: 
a network with N uniformly distributed sensor node over the 
area of 500m *500m squared field in a 2D scenario. Sensors 
and channels are stationary after deployment of the network 
with transmission radius of 200m. Sensing nodes are 
responsible to collect and forward the monitored data around 
them. The collected data is then sent to the sinker through 
channel. In order to detect the abnormal behavior of the sensor 
node we use the false massage detection. We will consider the 
system is synchronized. 
B. Abnormal Behaviour/Attacker Identification 
The false message or exponential message detection process 
in a channel is detected with one stationary sinker, in this 
paper in order to detect the attacker. Insider attacker or 
abnormal behavior  is not possible to detect only based on the 
cryptographic based technique, as the unreliable wireless 
channel makes it very easy to compromise the sensors and 
break the trust relationship established, so the security 
foundation become insufficient[2]. The false message 
detection mechanism focuses on the contingency of the 
message which defines as the exponential message attack.  
WSN is densely deployed and continuously observe the 
phenomenon, this characteristics drive the senor nodes 
network normally encounter the spatio-temporal correlation. 
In our research we considered the message generated from the 
nodes is similar for a defined period. In normal massage 
delivery of the nodes the probability of different message are 
negligible or rare. If is the length of the message with 
restricted memory,  is the message and   is considered as 
the frequency of the message we can write the Equation below 
     , 
|, 
; , 
, … … , , 
        (1) 
 
It is a set that will store the latest massage that is sent to the 
network recently.  If a new message sent to the network than 
that is  arrives at the channel than that is authenticated 
using the false message detection process [8]. 
 
 , 
  
 
!|
|| 
|
                                   (2) 
 
Based on the k-nearest neighbour algorithm we can find the 
normal message from the equation (2), this is the simple 
algorithm that classifies the data based on neighbour training 
example [9]. 
 
In which will be equivalent to, and if the result of the 
equation (2) match with the threshold than it will be 
considered as normal massage.The  will be compared 
with the whole set of  to determine whether does it match 
with  or not. If it matches it will increase the frequency  , 
or else it will be considered as false message and will be hold 
in to the buffer until it is authenticated. If it does not match 
than it will be considered as fake massage and it is the 
attacker. If the authentication process is not passed it will be 
considered as a fake message and will be identified as the 
attacked or abnormal sensor.  
In this method the calculation is simpler, the latency is 
smaller as well as less parameter is considered which is 
supported by the limited memory sensor nodes [8]. 
C. Attacker/Abnormal Sensor Location 
Location estimation is a complex process that involves 
multifaceted numerical operations. Unfortunately there is no 
simple process exists for the efficient computation of a 
location estimation of wireless sensor nodes. It is uncertain 
that a more complex mathematical computation will increase 
the accuracy of the estimation, conversely if a reduction of the 
complexity that would compromise with the efficiency of 
location estimation. 
In this paper we used the Time Difference of Arrival 
(TDoA) signal rather than absolute time of Time of Arrival 
(ToA). A signal is sent to the node by at least three antennas at 
an unknown and different time. The most common 
trilateration method is used in order to get the sensor node 
location [11]. For each TDoA measurement, the transmitter 
must lie on a hyperboloid with a constant range difference 
between the two measuring units. If we consider"is the 
Master Beacon node. The distance between the source and #$%Beacon node is  
&  '( ) *
 ) + ) ,
                                             (3) 
 
In the 2-D scenario the target location can be estimated 
from the intersection of two TDoA measurements. Beacon 
nodes (", "and"-) are considered as a measuring unit from 
which intersection point is determined and that locates the 
target point ., as shown in figure (1) below:  
 
 
Fig. 1 Attacker Location Detection by beacon nodes 
 
In Figure 1, Three sensors are defined as "with the location 
as* , ,
, where #= 1, 2 or 3. For any point .  *; ,
in the 
plane.[11] 
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The range difference between beacons with respect to the 
beacon"  where the signal arrives first, is 
 
&,  /,  & ) &                                 (4) 
 
where c is the signal propagation speed, &;is the range 
difference distance between the first beacon" and the #$% 
beacon"0

, & is the distance between the first beacon 
and the source, and /;is the estimated TDOA between the 
first beacon"and the #$%beacon"0

,. This defines the set 
of nonlinear hyperbolic equations whose solution gives the 2-
D coordinates of the source 
Solving the nonlinear equations of (4) is dificult. 
Consequently, linearizing this set of equations is commonly 
performed. One way of linearizing these equations is through 
the use of Taylor-series expansion and retaining the first two 
terms [12,13]. A commonly used alternative method to the 
Taylor-series expansion method, presented in [14, 15, 16, 17], 
is to first transform the set of nonlinear equations in (4) into 
another set of equations. Rearranging the form of (4) into 
 
&,  &, 1 &
                                         (5) 
 
Subtracting (3) at #   1 from (5) results in 
 
&, 1 2&,&  ( 1 + ) 2(,* ) 2+,, 1 * 1 ,     (6) 
 
where (;and +;are equal to (- (and +and +respectively. 
The set of equations in (6) are now linear with the source 
location .  *; ,
and the range of the first receiver to the 
source &as the unknowns, and are more easily handled. 
Inorder to solve the &we use Chan’s method, in this 
method a non-iterative solution to the hyperbolic position 
estimation problem which is capable of achieving optimum 
performance for arbitrarily placed sensors was proposed by 
Chan [18]. The solution is in closed-form and valid for both 
distant and close sources. When TDOA estimation errors are 
small, this method is an approximation to the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimator.  
Following Chan's method [18], for a three beacon node 
system ("  3), producing two TDOA's, x and y can be 
solved in terms of &from (6). The solution is in the form of 
 
5*,6  7(, +,(-, +-,8
   97&,&-,8 & 1

 :&,
 ) ; 1 ;&-, ) ;- 1 ;<=      (7) 
 
Where, 
;  ( 1 + ;  ( 1 + ;-  (- 1 +- 
 
When (7) is substituted into (3), with #   1, a quadratic 
equation in terms of & is produced. Substituting the positive 
root back into (7) results in the final solution. Therefore, we 
can find the location of the abnormal node which is .*;  ,
 
IV. RESULT 
In the experiment we have considered the temperature 
measurement field; the sensors are randomly deployed in the 
field and assumed that in the field the temperature would be 8 
to 14. At the beginning the test was done with 10 sensors 
where node 4 has different data and secondly with 20 sensors 
in which node 13 has different data to detect the false message 
in the Matlab environment. The result shows that it can detect 
the false massage is detected efficiently with the output 
massage neighbor node number to determine the neighbor 
euclidian distance used.  
 
 
Fig. 2 10 nodes deployed in the sensor field 
 
 
Fig. 3 20 node deployed in the sensor field 
 
When we determined with the false massage we can use the 
TDOA process to get the location by using equation (7), which 
is discussed in section 3.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented a novel framework to 
identify and locate the insider attacker that behave abnormally 
in the network in the wireless sensor network by using false 
massage detection and Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) 
method, the most common practice in wireless communication 
to detect the location. Due to the simplicity of the process this 
method may be useful for the small scale deployment. This 
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process in for the stationary sensors in future we will 
implement the process for mobile scenario.  
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